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CHAPTER 1
Making Decisions
about Embryonic
Stem Cell Research
M. Therese Lysaught, PhD
The controversy over human embryonic stem cell research(HESCR) has raged, now, for seven years with no sign of abat-
ing. Legislative initiatives crowd state ballots. Human cloning moves
forward with proposals for international research consortia. Prom-
ises, accusations, hope, and hype are bandied about in the press.
Positions seem intractably staked out, with little hope of resolution.
How are faithful Catholics to navigate this rapidly changing sci-
entific and legislative landscape? This chapter is designed to help
with that challenge. I begin by providing a brief background on stem
cells. I then review the debate on one of the central issues–the moral
status of the human embryo and then discuss other ethical consid-
erations that must be taken into account in assessing claims about
HESCR in the media and in decisions about federal and state legis-
lative initiatives. While these are currently the main issues, another
critical question could emerge if therapies are eventually developed
from HESCR. Patients may one day be faced with a decision about
whether to use such therapies. This, too, I will consider.
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Stem Cells—Embryonic and Otherwise
Human Embryonic Stem Cells
What is a stem cell? Stem cells form in the earliest stages of human
development after a fertilized egg begins to divide. After seven or
eight divisions, the egg is known as a blastocyst—a sphere made up
of two types of cells. One type forms a well-defined outer layer des-
tined to become the placenta and the remaining cells cluster to-
gether off to one side of the blastocyst. These cells are all the same.
That is, they have not started to “differentiate” or become the differ-
ent tissues that make up the human body and that will eventually
develop into a fetus. These “undifferentiated” cells are human em-
bryonic stem cells.
The controversy around human embryonic stem cells began in
November 1998 (though researchers have been working with em-
bryonic stem cells from different mammals since 1981) when two
researchers—John Gearhart at Johns Hopkins University and James
Thompson at the University of Wisconsin—announced that they
had figured out how to obtain human embryonic stem cells and
make them live and grow in their labs for up to nine months. Th-
ompson derived his cells from week-old human embryos produced
by in vitro fertilization. Gearhart isolated his from fetuses aborted
at five to nine weeks (Actually, the cells isolated by Gearhart are
technically called embryonic germ cells. They are precursors of
sperm and egg cells and are very similar to stem cells.) Both Th-
ompson and Gearhart demonstrated that human embryonic stem
cells (and germ cells) could be directed to “differentiate” into the
three basic types of embryonic tissue and, from there, into any of
the over two hundred types of cells in the human body.
Because they can develop into any type of tissue in the human
body, human embryonic stem cells, it is argued, have potential to
provide significant scientific and medical benefits. Scientifically,
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these cells would be ideal for studying human embryonic develop-
ment, particularly developmental disorders. Medical researchers also
anticipate a number of clinical applications. They imagine the pos-
sibility of growing organs to use for transplantation as well as tissue
to replace damaged tissue, potentially providing therapies for dis-
eases like Parkinson’s, juvenile diabetes, Alzheimer’s, congestive heart
failure, spinal cord injury, arthritis, muscular dystrophy, kidney dis-
ease, liver disease, and more. These cells could also be used for test-
ing pharmaceuticals and other chemicals to see if they are toxic or
effective.
Cloning
In the process described above, stem cells are obtained from em-
bryos created by “in vitro fertilization” (also known as IVF). These
embryos are either specifically created for research or, more fre-
quently, are obtained from fertility clinics. In the latter situation,
the embryos are created by couples facing reproductive obstacles
who desire to have children. Most often the IVF process results in
more embryos than can be implanted, so some are “left over.” Many
researchers see these “surplus” IVF embryos as a rich source of stem
cells.
When used for pharmaceutical testing or studying human de-
velopment, the source of the stem cells is not terribly important.
For purposes of potential therapeutic application, however, the
source can be critical. With stem cells as with any other type of tis-
sue or organ transplantation, rejection can occur. Consequently,
much of the interest has shifted to cloning as a source of stem cells.
Cloning, it is argued, would provide human embryonic stem cells
tailored to individual patients, thereby eliminating the risk of tissue
rejection.
Cloning is now often referred to as “somatic cell nuclear trans-
fer,” abbreviated SCNT. To make a clone, researchers must obtain
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an ovum and remove the nucleus (the center of the cell where most
of the genes reside). Then a cell (for example, a skin cell) is taken
from the body of a different adult, in this case the patient. Since it
comes from the patient’s body, it is referred to as a “somatic” cell
(somatic meaning “body”). The nucleus of this skin cell is also re-
moved and then injected or “transferred” into the enucleated ovum.
The ovum is then stimulated with an electrical charge, chemicals,
and hormones, and the materials from the two different cells fuse.
The ovum now has a full complement of genes and it begins to act
like it has been fertilized. It begins to divide and grow and become
an embryo.
At this point in the cloning process, two things could happen.
The embryo could be implanted into the uterus of a woman and
brought to term. The President’s Council on Bioethics names this
process “cloning to produce children.” Alternatively, the embryo
could be used as a source of stem cells that would be an exact ge-
netic match to the tissue of the patient who donated the skin cell.
Therefore, if these stem cells could be used to grow tissues or or-
gans or derive other therapies, the products generated from the stem
cells would not be rejected by the patient. The President’s Council
names this process “cloning for biomedical research.” The President’s
Council prefers these two phrases over those more commonly heard
in the media—particularly, “reproductive cloning and therapeutic
cloning”—which they believe mask any attempt to “solve moral
questions by artful redefinition.”
Adult Stem Cells
Embryos are not the only source of stem cells. Although somewhat
more difficult to locate and isolate, stem cells are found in all tissues
in the human body—in the liver, bone marrow, brain, and so on.
Stem cells, as noted earlier, give rise to all these different tissues. But
when they do, reservoirs of undifferentiated stem cells remain in
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order to replenish tissue over our lifetime and to repair damage to
tissue when it occurs. These stem cells can be culled out of the vari-
ous tissues in which they reside and then cultivated and used for
therapeutic purposes. Although they are found in infants as well,
these cells are referred to as “adult stem cells.”
Adult stem cells have been used therapeutically for over forty
years. What used to be referred to as a “bone marrow transplant” is
now referred to as a “stem cell transplant,” because the therapeutic
agent in the transplant consists in stem cells in the bone marrow.
The therapeutic potential of adult stem cells has also been demon-
strated in the treatment of other diseases, including diabetes, ad-
vanced kidney cancer, heart disease, and more. Many clinical trials
are currently underway to assess the therapeutic effectiveness of adult
stem cells against a variety of conditions. That adult stem cell re-
search has advanced to and through the stage of clinical trials is
highly significant.
The flexibility of adult stem cells is as yet unclear. Until recently,
it was believed that adult stem cells were limited in their ability to
be transformed into any type of tissue in the body. It was believed
that they were too specialized—for example, blood-forming stem
cells could only form blood cells; liver stem cells could only form
liver cells, and so on. As more research has been conducted on adult
stem cells, however, it appears that they may be far more flexible
than previously thought. Adult stem cells offer patients the same
advantage as that proposed for cloning—they are an exact genetic
match to the patient, eliminating the risk of rejection.
Stem Cells from Umbilical Cord Blood
One final source of stem cells is umbilical cord blood. The blood
in the umbilical cord and placenta is unique because it contains
large numbers of blood-forming stem cells. For almost twenty years,
cord blood has been used in lieu of bone marrow in what is now
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recognized to be stem cell transplants, as noted above. Cord blood
banks have grown over time, recruiting expectant mothers to do-
nate their baby’s umbilical cord blood for research and transplanta-
tion. Since the advent of interest in human embryonic stem cells,
the stem cells from cord blood are being studied in a new way as an
alternative source of stem cells for developing treatments for life-
threatening diseases.
With almost four million babies born every year in the U.S.
alone, cord blood represents an extraordinary resource for obtain-
ing stem cells. Again, as in the case of cloning, these stem cells would
be an exact genetic match to the donor (the baby), but could also be
used to treat nonrelated patients. Cord blood banks are currently
growing, nationally and internationally.
The Moral Status of the Embryo
The debate on the morality of HESCR centers, of course, on the
destruction of human embryos. For many who consider embryos
to be living human beings, this in and of itself raises insurmount-
able moral barriers to this type of research. Others, however, view
embryos differently. Four primary positions have emerged on this
question.
Embryos Are Not Human Life
A first position denies that the blastocyst qualifies as “human” life.
Some view the blastocyst as simply human tissue, a cluster of cells,
insufficiently organized to qualify as a “living being.” Others argue
that the mode of origination makes a difference. Since, in the case
of in vitro fertilization and especially SCNT (somatic cell nuclear
transfer—cloning), the natural process of human fertilization is
bypassed, the blastocyst or embryo should not be considered the
same as other embryos. SCNT, rather than creating a new human
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life, simply “extends and expands the donor’s cell mass” and should
therefore be seen as an extension of the donor to be used as she or
he wishes. Often, the products of these technological processes are
referred to as “clonates” or “recombinant embryos.” Thus, if the em-
bryo is simply human tissue or is relocated into a different category
of identity, the moral question simply goes away. As the President’s
Council noted, however, one should always exercise caution in the
face of new language.
Embryos Are Not Human Persons
A second position grants that the blastocyst qualifies as human life
but argues that because it lacks certain characteristics (most often,
consciousness and self-awareness), it does not count as a human
person. Embryos may certainly have the potential to become human
persons, it is argued, but since that potential is not yet realized, they
cannot yet be accorded the same respect due a person and do not
have the rights of a person.
Similarly, some Catholic moral theologians argue that the blas-
tocyst is too undeveloped to be counted as a human person. Before
it implants (ten to fourteen days after fertilization), a blastocyst is
still open to the possibility of splitting in two—in other words, of
becoming twins. As long as a blastocyst is open to this possibility,
an important precondition of personal identity—namely, individu-
ality—is not yet established. Thus, they argue that the blastocyst
cannot be considered a human person and therefore, although it
deserves “respect,” it does not deserve the level of respect that must
be accorded to embryos that have been implanted (rarely is there
any specification of what such “respect” concretely entails). There-
fore, embryos can potentially be used or treated in ways that other
human beings who have attained the status of “persons” cannot.
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Human Life Versus Human Life
A third position theoretically accepts that human embryos might
rightly be considered living human beings but then takes a utilitar-
ian line of reasoning. Typically it weighs the loss of a minimal num-
ber of human embryos against the “millions” (the number often
given) of human lives that could potentially be saved or helped
should HESCR and cloning bear therapeutic fruit. This position
emerges especially in relation to the fate of “surplus” IVF embryos.
Many argue that since these embryos are going to be discarded any-
way, they should be used for research and the development of thera-
pies that could (theoretically) relieve the suffering of other human
beings. The moral benefits of the research, they argue, outweigh the
moral costs.
Many proposals put forward in favor of HESCR almost univer-
sally draw the line at fourteen days. But importantly, once those
arguments are deemed acceptable—namely, that embryos are not
“persons” because they lack some characteristic—then that line be-
comes quite fragile. What is to prevent that line from being extended
into the fetal or even preterm stages if it were found that cells at
those stages are more usable for therapies? How will one hold the
line against this type of argumentation if one has admitted its ac-
ceptability elsewhere, especially against the overriding imperative
of relieving suffering?
Embryos Are Living Human Subjects
A fourth position, one that shapes official Catholic teaching, argues
that blastocysts and embryos are indeed living human subjects with
a right to life whose dignity is to be respected from fertilization to
death. This position holds that at conception a unique individual is
created, one with a unique genetic endowment that organizes and
guides the expression of both its shared human identity and its own
individual character. That which gives it its own unique identity is
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already “realized” in its genetic makeup. This position is radically
egalitarian, seeing each human life equal in worth and dignity to
other human life, regardless of one’s social, intellectual, or physical
condition. Moreover, it highlights the fundamental Christian con-
viction captured in the important principle of the “preferential op-
tion for the poor”—that we are to provide greater protections to-
ward those who are weak, vulnerable, and not self-sufficient, not
less. Thus, research that destroys human embryos is gravely immoral,
regardless of the positive outcomes or the intention to help others.
Further Moral Considerations
The concern for the dignity of the human person does not exhaust
the moral analysis. Rather, it interfaces with other moral consider-
ations that further express the Church’s commitment to human life
and dignity. I shall now consider some of these.
The Church’s Commitment to Healing and Research
The Catholic Church has long been at the forefront of the human
obligation to heal and care for the sick. From the gospels onward,
healing has been recognized as something central to the activity of
Christ, to the presence of God in the world, and therefore to the
work of the Church and to the meaning of Christian discipleship.
This commitment is embodied in the extensive network of Catho-
lic hospitals and health care-related facilities worldwide.
Moreover, the Church has long supported and promoted sci-
entific research for the benefit of humanity through various Vatican
offices that focus on questions of science and technology as well as
through the extensive network of Catholic colleges, universities, and
medical schools around the globe. While the Church has tradition-
ally encouraged investigation in the fields of medicine and biology,
with the goal of curing diseases and improving the quality of life for
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all, it does maintain that such research and clinical care must be
respectful of the dignity of the human being.
Thus, faith and rigorous science and medicine are not mutually
exclusive. Nonetheless, pursuit of healing and research must be situ-
ated within a broader moral framework that can direct these tools
toward the common good. Without this, they become ends-in-them-
selves, a form of idolatry. The Church’s position on HESCR, there-
fore, must be situated within the broader context of its longstanding
and ongoing commitment to quality medical care and rigorous re-
search.
Risks of Harm
In evaluating any new, experimental interventions one must also
consider the balance between the probable benefit versus probable
harm. But this must be done with care. As we have seen, a utilitarian
view suggests that the harm done to embryos is outweighed by the
potential benefit to those stricken with diseases. Here the burdens
or harms fall on one population (the embryos that are “sacrificed”)
and the benefits accrue to another population (future patients).
History has recognized the dangers of calculating harm and benefit
in this way. Generally, harms are permitted to fall on populations
that lack power or voice, while the benefits accrue to those most
similar to the ones making the calculation.
Furthermore, given the probability that therapeutic applications,
if they occur at all, are likely to take three to five decades to develop,
the harm/benefit analysis is unbalanced. The “harms” (if one counts
the destruction of human embryos as a serious moral consideration)
are real harms being incurred now, while the possible benefits re-
main future and hypothetical. They may well never be realized. Those
who are sensitive to the issue of who bears the harms—a serious
justice issue and one which does not occur with adult stem cells—
would counsel against HESCR.
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Profits and Products
Over the past thirty years or so, biotech research has come to be
fueled much more by profits and commercialization than by altru-
istic motives. Consequently, no HESCR initiative can be assessed
apart from considerations of the commodification and commer-
cialization of human tissue—that is, of turning human body parts
into products to be traded, objects to be bought and sold.
Interestingly, much of the controversy over HESCR since 1998
has concerned funding, particularly the use of federal funds, that is,
tax-payer dollars. As with all new biotech developments, one must
ask who stands to profit? Profitability is clearly a primary driving
force behind this research. The company that funded Thomson’s
and Gearhart’s work (Geron), for example, now holds an exclusive
license on their techniques. Those who wish to develop stem cells
for research or potential therapies have to pay Geron a fee. Typi-
cally, with each new step of research along the way, there is a rush to
patent, even when the research is publicly funded. Ironically, those
who “donate” the “raw materials” (eggs and sperm) to make cloned
embryos or those who donate their “surplus” IVF embryos cannot
be paid (though egg donors can be compensated for their “inconve-
nience”). Apart from the profit motive and the related commercial-
ization of human tissues is the issue of commodification. Most of
the legislative efforts that have been advanced in favor of cloning
propose that the manufacture of embryos as material for research
or therapy be overseen by the FDA, thereby classifying human em-
bryos as marketable “biological products.” What does such language
assume and convey? How is our understanding of nascent human
life—as well as the rest of human life—transformed when we change
our terms and begin speaking of embryos as “products”?
If we assume that HESCR or cloning for research actually be-
comes clinically useful, providing benefits to “millions” of patients
as is often promised, the process of creation (whether cloned or
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created through IVF), destruction, and trading of nascent human
life would need to be institutionalized in a systematic and large-
scale manner. Human lives would by necessity become products of
a manufacturing technique. How would this affect the dignity of
the human person broadly speaking? Would it be possible to treat
one embodiment of human life in this manner without it affecting
how we view human life as a whole? That HESCR is so deeply im-
plicated in the profit motive and commodification raises serious
questions for its impact on the dignity of human life in general and,
therefore, on the common good.
Social Justice
The Catholic social justice tradition raises another set of questions,
as Joseph Cardinal Bernardin reminds us, “life” issues and social
justice issues are parts of a single piece. While not unique to stem
cell research, one must always consider the deep contradiction in
our culture, that is, when so many resources are mustered to gain
funding for one particular initiative—one that may take decades to
bear fruit—while we lack the political will to make basic, real thera-
pies available to people who need them now.
In November 2004, the people of California passed a proposi-
tion to fund embryonic stem cell research with a three billion dollar
bond issue that will actually cost them six billion dollars in princi-
pal and interest. Yet seven million Californians and forty-five mil-
lion Americans have no health insurance coverage. Twelve million
children in the U.S. live in poverty. Worldwide, twenty-eight thou-
sand children per day—over ten million children per year—die from
preventable diseases. One person dies every six seconds from a dis-
ease for which we have vaccines. Is it just to redirect resources of
this magnitude away from real needs that could be met now with
readily available resources to fund a line of research that might never
bear fruit? Against the claim of proponents of HESCR that it will
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one day relieve enormous human suffering stands a sea of real, im-
mediate human suffering that could easily be addressed with readily
available interventions. Moreover, should HESCR ever bear thera-
peutic fruit, will these same children who are dying in the millions,
these same people who lack access to vaccines or drugs, have access
to high-tech therapies developed from HESCR or cloned embryos?
Probably not. We must ask: Is HESCR or human cloning the best
place to invest if economic resources are limited? What will go un-
funded so that HESCR can move forward?
A second social justice question concerns the source of the raw
materials for this research. IVF and human cloning require human
eggs. Current legislation requires that embryos and ova be “donated”
for research. Women cannot be paid for them, though they can be
compensated (approximately $2,400) for the “inconvenience” egg
donation entails, which is considerable. With the goal being to maxi-
mize efficiency and harvest as many eggs as possible from each
round, is there a risk that women might be prescribed excessive doses
of fertility drugs so that they can produce more eggs?
In addition, were HESCR or cloning to bear therapeutic fruit,
there will be a large-scale need for ova. It is not farfetched to imag-
ine that underprivileged women in the U.S. or abroad might find
the “compensation” offered for egg donation hard to resist. And
should egg harvesting go “off shore,” as has so much industrial pro-
duction in recent years, it is likely that any safeguards that are in
place in the U.S. will be pushed aside and any compensation offered
will mirror the dollar a day that foreign workers make in free-trade
zones. It is extremely difficult to enforce ethical guidelines in the
face of the overwhelming pressure to create results, to fulfill the sci-
entific imperative. These social justice questions should raise some
of the most critical (though unfortunately often overlooked) con-
cerns for the practice of HESCR.
M. Therese Lysaught, PhD32
The Use of Therapies Derived
from Human Embryonic Stem Cells
One final question must be asked. In the event that human embry-
onic stem cell research or cloning bear therapeutic fruit, would it be
morally licit for a Catholic to use those therapies? If, in other words,
one has a therapy derived using means considered to be immoral
by the Church, is the use of that therapy then likewise considered
morally problematic?
Appropriation and Complicity
The answer to this question will depend in large part on the mode
and infrastructure of production of such therapies. While patients
in these cases might not be directly or even indirectly involved with
the wrongdoing itself, what moral judgment can be offered about
those who knowingly “appropriate” the outcomes of evil actions? If
someone were to give you a pile of money that you knew had been
robbed from a bank, would you not be “ratifying” the wrong done if
you kept and used it? Would the use of therapies, especially the regu-
lar use of therapies in a chronic condition, render one complicit in
some way? When I benefit over and over again from a wrong while
simply ignoring the wrong itself, do I entrench myself in an estab-
lished relationship with that wrong whether I approve of it or not?
Within the Catholic tradition, levels of complicity are deter-
mined in part by the degree of distance one can achieve between
one’s own action and the wrongdoing. Such distance can be achieved
in a number of ways. One is time. If two actions are separated by a
significant amount of time, the later one may be justifiable or, at
least, the moral taint may be minimized. A second is the degree of
separation or the number of steps intervening between a present
act and a prior act. A third is whether or not the original evil act or
practice is ongoing. A fourth is whether refusal to participate in a
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set of practices due to their link with prior evil would, if practiced
broadly, effectively unravel the social fabric and be detrimental to
the common good.
Given the current status of stem cell research, it is doubtful
whether one could establish sufficient distance between any thera-
pies and the destruction of embryos. Researchers continue to develop
new stem cell lines. Furthermore, if therapies are ever developed,
their utilization would fuel the ongoing practice of stem cell deriva-
tion; it would create a demand, and given the probable high cost of
these interventions, it would likewise create a market. Indeed, it
would require and create an industrial-level institutionalization of
the destruction of embryos, thereby encouraging, providing a sup-
portive alliance, or even lending legitimacy to the destruction of
human life based on the premise of healing. The only reason for
destroying the embryos is to gain the stem cells and there would be
few intervening steps between the embryo and the therapeutically
applied tissues.
Some argue that to shun this research will undercut the com-
mon good by preventing the development of therapies that could
benefit large numbers of people. At this juncture, the benefits are
theoretical and will most likely not be produced for decades, if at
all. Many an embryo will be sacrificed from which no good will
come. If the goods are not immediate, there remains the question
of alternatives. Given the promise of adult stem cells and cord blood,
the active pursuit of these alternatives would not only avoid the
issue of complicity entirely but would provide a powerful counter-
practice that would largely render moot the topic at hand.
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Conclusion
One positive outcome of the debate over HESCR that emerged in
2005 is that some scientists have been earnestly looking for alterna-
tive ways to develop embryonic stem cells without destroying hu-
man life. Some are doing this simply because they do not want their
work to be caught up in controversy. Others are doing it because
they care deeply about respecting human life. Within the past year,
two possibilities have been put forward. One proposes to limit cur-
rent pre-implantation genetic techniques in order to make possible
the remove of a single stem cell from an embryo without destroy-
ing it. Another suggests a mechanism similar to SCNT, but altering
the ovum ahead of time so that when fused with the adult body cell,
it has no possibility of ever developing into an embryo. These alter-
natives may raise their own issues, but it is heartening to see that
science can indeed respond to moral argument and can then do
what it does best—creatively pursue new and less morally grave
avenues to achieve worthy goals.
In the end, addressing HESCR requires the virtue of prudence.
Most forms of moral reasoning, including Catholic moral reason-
ing, hold that if one is presented with two courses of action, one of
which is morally less controversial or noncontroversial, one ought
to choose that option. It may well be more complicated, less effi-
cient, more time-consuming, and so on, but generally, prudence
would counsel the morally safer course. Thus, alternative sources
of stem cells provide a noncontroversial way to pursue the real goods
promised by regenerative medicine. They also provide more realis-
tic hope for therapeutic benefit.
The Christian tradition has long held that the cultivation of
one virtue simultaneously engages the cultivation of others. In the
case of HESCR, we must remain attentive to the role of virtues in
MAKING DECISIONS ABOUT EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH 35
our discernment and relationship to this practice. The virtue of
honesty will call us to “fair and accurate” language in our descrip-
tions of these processes and entities. The virtue of hope will push us
to foster realistic hope rather than raising false hope through hype.
The virtue of justice will sharpen our radars for how these tech-
nologies impact the poor and vulnerable. The virtue of fortitude
may well be required should one decide to choose against a therapy
that could save one’s own life yet would enmesh one too deeply in a
morally problematic infrastructure. And so on.
The Christian tradition has much to offer those seeking to navi-
gate the often confusing terrain of HESCR. Through a richer under-
standing of the moral life, of the human person, of moral analysis,
and its deep commitment to healing and knowledge, the Christian
tradition provides a sound and hopeful way forward.
Questions for Discussion
1. Do you agree with the Church’s and the author’s position that
the destruction of human embryos to obtain stem cells is mor-
ally wrong, even when done in the hope of eventually relieving
human suffering? Why? Why not?
2. What view of the moral status of the embryo do you hold? Why?
3. Do you believe it is morally permissible to destroy “spare em-
bryos,” that is, frozen embryos left over from in vitro fertiliza-
tion, in order to obtain stem cells?
4. Do you think that too much money is being spent on embry-
onic stem cell research when that money could be used to pro-
vide basic health care to many people who are without it?
5. Do you agree with the author that if therapies are ever devel-
oped from human embryonic stem cell research, it would not
be ethical to use them?
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